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Decision intelligence: track record

Corporate finance and asset sales, public procurement, defence procurement, infrastructure investment and value for money — filter by review type or subject to find specific work.

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Corporate Finance & Investment

Professional Intelligence

Independent analysis of government corporate finance transactions: privatisations, asset sales, investment programmes and portfolio governance. All reports referenced were published by the National Audit Office; Matthew Rees led and authored this work during his appointment.

How does government bring a company to the stock market?

When government decides to privatise a public corporation through an IPO, the mechanics of how it manages the sale process: book-building, price setting, share allocation and the treatment of investor categories — determine whether the public purse receives full value.

The privatisation of Royal Mail raised significant questions about all of these. The first-day share price gain of £750m was a tiny window into the IPO pricing, but the after-market performance in the months and years ahead was beyond the scope of a traditional hindsight evaluation. Understanding the trade-offs between broad retail participation, institutional stability and price maximisation is essential for anyone involved in a future transaction. Considering the long-term implications of state or private sector ownership of regulated utilities and critical national infrastructure requires a long-term perspective typically beyond the scope of traditional scrutiny techniques.

IPOinitial public offeringshare salebook buildingprivatisationprice discoveryunderwritingretail offer

SDWH provides independent analysis of:

  • Business case rationale; the structure and sequencing of public asset sale options
  • Governance arrangements for sale processes
  • Evaluation of sale outcomes against market benchmarks
  • Briefing material for ministers and accounting officers

How should government structure a competitive sale to maximise proceeds?

Not all government asset sales involve a stock market listing. Many, including the disposal of minority equity stakes in commercial enterprises, are better suited to a private auction process involving financial and strategic parties. Getting that process right matters enormously for the proceeds achieved, the scrutiny that follows and the wider public interest, competition and national security implications.

The sale of the government's minority stake in Eurostar raised £757m and is a case study in how a well-run competitive auction can deliver value even in a complex cross-border transaction. It also illustrates how to manage valuation uncertainty, structure bidder competition, and sequence the transaction to maintain leverage.

minority stakesale processvaluationcompetitive auctiondivestitureproceedscross-bordertransaction management

SDWH provides independent analysis of:

  • How sale processes have been designed and sequenced in comparable transactions
  • Value drivers and how business modelling approaches have been applied
  • How sale outcomes have been evaluated against market benchmarks
  • Post-sale scrutiny and lessons learned

What happens when a government-backed company faces insolvency, and how does government protect the public interest?

When a company that the public depends upon hits financial or commercial challenges, government and regulators are faced with urgent decisions. Special administration regimes exist in sectors including energy and utilities, precisely to manage operational continuity through a failure event while protecting consumers and recovering public funds.

The collapse of Bulb Energy and the subsequent Special Administration Process is the most significant recent test of this framework. It raised fundamental questions about how a government-backed administration maintains services, manages hedging and collateral exposures, and ultimately recovers taxpayer emergency funding. The eventual sale to Octopus Energy also provides a live case study in disposal from administration.

special administration regimeinsolvencyenergy securitysupplier of last resorthedgingcollateralrecovery of taxpayer funding

SDWH provides independent analysis of:

  • Risk and contingency frameworks for regulators and government departments
  • Recovery and resolution arrangement design
  • The adequacy of government exposure management in high-risk portfolios

How does government manage its portfolio of financial institutions, and what oversight do they require?

Government has significant stakes and exposures across a wide range of financial institutions including the development banks that it has founded to deliver policy objectives including SME lending, climate change, housing and infrastructure investment. Most of these operate as arm's-length bodies via departmental sponsorship arrangements.

A systematic mapping of this landscape identified over 50 institutions and pointed towards the need for proportionate governance and accountability arrangements, consistent principles to establish the appropriate economic classification and balance sheet treatment in the national accounts, and clear performance metrics including the expected risk and return objectives.

policy banksdevelopment bankspublic financial institutionPuFinBritish Business Bankportfoliooversight

SDWH provides independent analysis of:

  • Financial institution portfolio mapping and classification
  • Governance gap analysis
  • Oversight framework design for arm's-length financial bodies

How many companies does government own, and what are the accountability implications?

Central government departments own approximately 450 Companies Act entities — subsidiaries, joint ventures and portfolio companies sitting outside the traditional public bodies framework. The governance and accountability implications of this are substantial and frequently underestimated.

This work identified the governance and oversight implications for the full portfolio, including the use of golden shares, the role of accounting officers, and the extent to which departmental oversight keeps pace with commercial activity.

corporate governanceCompanies Actgolden sharesaccounting officerportfoliosubsidiaryoversight

SDWH provides independent analysis of:

  • Portfolio governance arrangements
  • Accountability framework design for government-owned companies
  • Briefing to prepare accounting officers for scrutiny of their commercial holdings

How do you assess value for money in corporate finance transactions across the public sector?

Government corporate finance covers a wide and varied territory: equity and debt investments, guarantees, sales and privatisations, joint ventures, and portfolio management. Each type of transaction has distinct financial characteristics and distinct value-for-money risks.

This assessment framework — drawing on over 140 NAO reports — provides a structured basis for evaluating any government corporate finance decision. It is particularly useful for teams preparing for scrutiny, or for those who need to benchmark a proposed transaction against how comparable decisions have been handled.

equitydebtguaranteeinvestmentsaleprivatisationIPOauctionportfoliojoint venture

SDWH provides independent analysis of:

  • Transaction evaluation frameworks
  • Pre-scrutiny preparation and briefing
  • Training on government corporate finance disciplines

Public Procurement

Professional Intelligence

Independent analysis of public procurement: frameworks, competition, commercial lifecycle management and contract scrutiny. All reports referenced were published by the National Audit Office; Matthew Rees led and authored this work during his appointment.

How can government spend its £125bn common goods and services budget more efficiently?

A significant proportion of government procurement is for goods and services bought across multiple departments — energy, IT, facilities management, professional services, temporary labour. The potential savings from coordinated purchasing are substantial, but so are the institutional barriers.

This work examined how central purchasing bodies and procurement frameworks actually operate across the public sector, and identified the key structural choices — aggregation, supply chain mapping, category management, levy, commission and rebate structures, social value measurement — that determine whether centralised procurement delivers genuine savings or simply creates a new layer of cost and complexity.

frameworkscentral purchasing bodiesaggregationcategory managementleviesrebatessavingsspend analysis

SDWH provides independent analysis of:

  • Procurement strategy options; framework design and evaluation
  • Spend analysis and opportunity identification
  • Supply chain structure

What are the risks when a procurement framework has only one supplier?

Single-supplier procurement frameworks offer administrative convenience but create significant resilience and value-for-money risks. When that supplier serves a critical public service — as in the case of pharmaceutical supply chain finance in the NHS — the consequences of failure can be severe and the recovery options limited.

This investigation identified the specific vulnerabilities created by sole-source framework arrangements, the warning signs that preceded supplier distress, and the steps procurement teams should take to maintain optionality and resilience in high-dependency supply chains.

single sourcesupplier failuresupply chainresilienceNHSpharmaceutical

SDWH provides independent analysis of:

  • Supply chain resilience; sole-source dependency mapping
  • Framework design options incorporating competitive provisions
  • Supplier risk factors

How much does lack of competition cost the public sector, and what can procurement officials do about it?

The economic cost of insufficient competition in public procurement is not abstract. This work put a number on it: £4–8bn per year in potential benefits, or 1–2% of what government spends every year on goods and services. It set out 18 practitioner-focused recommendations for procurement officials across a wide range of acquisition and outsourcing contexts.

The analysis pays particular attention to the rapid growth of procurement frameworks and the ways in which framework use, if poorly managed, can entrench incumbent suppliers and undermine competitive discipline even in markets where genuine competition exists.

public procurementdirect awardcompetitionframeworkcompetitive tensionmarket testingincumbent

SDWH provides independent analysis of:

  • Competition strategy options; market analysis for major procurements
  • Framework design incorporating meaningful competitive provisions
  • Pre-market engagement approaches

What does successful procurement look like from start to finish?

Most procurement failures are not failures of intention but failures of execution at specific stages: a specification that locks in an incumbent, a contract that creates no incentive for performance, a transition arrangement that leaves the organisation exposed at handover.

This 10-stage strategic guide to the commercial lifecycle maps the decisions that matter at each stage, the questions that should be asked, and the governance arrangements that support good outcomes. It was reissued to support the Procurement Act 2023, making it directly relevant to current practice.

contractingprocurementoutsourcingcontract managementtransitionProcurement Act 2023

SDWH provides independent analysis of:

  • Commercial lifecycle stages and decision points; outsourcing strategy options
  • Contract management arrangements; post-award governance design
  • Procurement Act 2023 readiness

How do you scrutinise a major government procurement or contract?

Those examining government commercial activity need a structured approach that covers the full commercial lifecycle — from requirements definition through to contract exit. Without that, findings tend to cluster around process compliance rather than the decisions that actually determined value.

This framework identifies what reviewers should look for at each of the 10 commercial lifecycle stages, and how to calibrate review depth to the complexity and risk of the contract in question. It is directly applicable to both internal and external review functions.

contractingcommercial reviewframeworkProcurement Act 2023value for money

SDWH provides independent analysis of:

  • Commercial review framework design; commercial risk factors
  • Preparation for external scrutiny of procurement activity
  • Training on commercial lifecycle stages

Defence Procurement

Integrated Intelligence

Independent analysis of single-source defence contracting: profit rates, allowable costs and the SSRO regulatory framework. All reports referenced were published by the Single Source Regulations Office; Matthew Rees led and authored this work during his appointment.

How is profit determined when there is no competitive market to set the price?

In a competitive market, price is set by competition. In single-source defence contracting, there is no competition, so profit and incentive structures are guided through a regulatory regime. Getting this right matters because single-source contracts account for a significant share of the defence equipment budget.

This work examined how cost risk and profit incentives are structured in single-source contracts, what drives variation in outcomes, and whether the regulatory framework creates the right commercial signals for both government and contractor.

single sourcedefencecost riskincentiveprofitcontract pricingSSRODefence Reform Act

SDWH provides independent analysis of:

  • Single-source pricing structures; cost risk and incentive design
  • The SSRO regulatory framework and its commercial implications
  • Briefing for procurement teams and finance directors

What is a fair profit rate for a defence contractor, and how should government derive it?

The baseline profit rate applied to single-source defence contracts is recommended by the SSRO through a statutory process and updated annually. Understanding how that rate is derived — the benchmarking methodology, the treatment of risk, the capital base assumptions — is essential for both government and contractors seeking to understand pricing discussions.

This work examined the inaugural review of the methodology to consider how to calibrate the balance intended between government and its strategic suppliers, and identified the key choices that determine the range of rates that emerge from benchmarking techniques.

contract profit rateSSRObaseline profit ratebenchmarkingcapital basesingle sourcepricing

SDWH provides independent analysis of:

  • Profit rate derivation methodology; benchmarking approaches and their limitations
  • The SSRO regulatory framework
  • Analytical context for understanding contract pricing

What costs can a defence contractor legitimately charge to government?

The allowable costs framework is the foundation of single-source contract pricing. It defines which costs are attributable, reasonable and appropriate — and therefore recoverable under a government contract. Getting this right protects both the public interest and the contractor's legitimate cost recovery.

This was the first edition of the allowable costs guidance, published to establish the single-source contracts regime. It remains the definitional reference for anyone working within the SSRO framework. The SSRO is the custodian of subsequent editions and readers should consult the SSRO website for the most recent version.

allowable costsattributablereasonablesingle sourceSSROdefencecost recoveryDefence Reform Act

SDWH provides independent analysis of:

  • Allowable cost framework design; cost attribution principles
  • The structure and intent of the single-source regime
  • Briefing on the allowable costs guidance

Infrastructure Investment

Professional Intelligence

Independent analysis of infrastructure financing: PFI, PPP, government guarantees, public land disposal and capital investment appraisal. All reports referenced were published by the National Audit Office; Matthew Rees led and authored this work during his appointment.

When should government use private finance to deliver infrastructure, and what conditions make it work?

Private finance, whether through PFI, PPP, or bespoke structures, can accelerate infrastructure delivery and transfer risk to parties better placed to manage it. It can also be expensive, inflexible, and poorly suited to projects where demand or technology risk is hard to price. The decision framework matters enormously.

This work distilled 12 key considerations from over 140 prior NAO reports — covering how government creates the right market conditions, makes effective financing decisions, and applies an appropriate commercial strategy for using private capital in infrastructure delivery. It is the most comprehensive synthesis of lessons from the UK's experience of private finance in infrastructure.

infrastructure investmentPFIPPPprivate financerisk transfermarket conditionscost of capital

SDWH provides independent analysis of:

  • Private finance decision frameworks; business case structure for capital projects
  • Risk allocation options
  • The conditions under which private finance has and has not delivered value in comparable programmes

How do government guarantees support private infrastructure investment, and what do they cost the taxpayer?

Government guarantees can unlock private investment in infrastructure that would otherwise not proceed — by reducing the financing cost for projects that meet certain eligibility criteria. But guarantees are contingent liabilities: the cost to the taxpayer is not zero, and the pricing and risk management of the guarantee portfolio matters. A call on a guarantee triggers an immediate cash cost for the guarantor to settle the guaranteed commitment, such as repaying a lender when the borrower has defaulted on a guaranteed loan.

The UK Guarantees Scheme managed a portfolio of £1.7bn in unconditional and irrevocable guarantees as part of a £40bn programme — and the NAO's assessment of this work was attributed with £1,372m of financial impact in the 2024–25 Annual Report. This work examined how guarantees were priced to satisfy state aid requirements, how credit risk was monitored, and what the tail-risk exposure implied for public finances.

state aiddebtcredit riskbondscontingent liabilitytail-riskinfrastructure guarantee

SDWH provides independent analysis of:

  • Guarantee framework structure and design options
  • Contingent liability assessment approaches; pricing framework methodology
  • Governance arrangements for government guarantee portfolios

How should government release public land to support housing delivery, and what does good value look like?

Government holds substantial land assets that could support new housing delivery. The decision about how to release that land — through joint ventures, direct sales, or development agreements — determines the proceeds achieved and the number of homes, business premises or infrastructure that will ultimately be constructed. These objectives are not always aligned.

This work examined the programme to release government land banks and found that, at the point of review, government was not systematically collecting data on either sale proceeds or housing delivery — making it impossible to assess value. The review prompted a change in approach.

joint ventureland-bankhousingproceedsdisposalpublic landaffordable housing

SDWH provides independent analysis of:

  • How land disposal strategies and joint venture arrangements have been structured in comparable programmes
  • Value assessment frameworks
  • The trade-offs between financial and policy objectives in asset disposal programmes

What are the real trade-offs between government borrowing and private finance for capital investment?

The choice between financing capital investment through government borrowing and using private finance involves trade-offs that can lead to misunderstanding on both sides. Private finance is not simply "off balance sheet" government borrowing, and government borrowing is not always cheaper when risk is properly accounted for.

This work provides a rigorous framework for comparing public and private financing alternatives, examining the contribution of private finance to infrastructure delivery and the conditions under which each approach delivers better value. It draws on the UK's extensive — and mixed — experience of both.

government borrowinggreen bookPFIPPPcapital investmentcost of capitaloff balance sheetwhole-life cost

SDWH provides independent analysis of:

  • Financing option appraisal methodology; Green Book alignment for major capital decisions
  • The risk-adjusted cost comparison between public and private finance

Value for Money

Professional Intelligence

A structured reference guide to value for money in the UK public sector: government guidance, the 3Es framework, performance audit standards and the INTOSAI ISSAI framework.

Value for money in government

UK central government operates within a framework of guidance that defines how value for money should be demonstrated at every stage of the policy and spending cycle — from rationale and appraisal through to evaluation and feedback.

How does government define value for money?

The Green Book is the UK government's guidance on appraisal — the process of assessing the costs, benefits and risks of options for achieving government objectives. It defines value for money as the balanced judgement about the optimal use of public resources to achieve the objectives of a proposal.

That judgement requires consideration of: how well the proposal performs against its objectives; the monetisable and non-monetisable costs and benefits to society; the public sector financial impact; how costs and benefits are distributed across social groups and places; and the risk and uncertainty inherent in the proposal. A proposal that does not deliver its objectives cannot represent value for money regardless of its cost.

The Green Book structures the policy and spending cycle through the ROAMEF framework: Rationale (why does government need to act?), Objectives (what are the intended outcomes?), Appraisal (what options exist and how do they compare?), Monitoring (how will progress be tracked?), Evaluation (did the intervention perform as expected?) and Feedback (how will lessons learned inform future policy?). The Green Book primarily addresses the first three stages.

Relevant to SDWH analysis of:

  • Business case appraisal and options assessment for major programmes
  • The standard against which NAO and PAC assess whether government decisions represented value for money
  • Pre-scrutiny preparation for accounting officers and private office teams

Why do accounting officers need to apply value for money principles?

Managing Public Money sets out the four standards that accounting officers are personally responsible for applying to every significant decision. Value for money is one of those four standards, alongside regularity, propriety and feasibility.

Regularity requires that a transaction has sufficient legal basis, Parliamentary authority and Treasury authorisation, and is compatible with the relevant spending framework.

Propriety requires that proposals meet high standards of public conduct and comply with Parliamentary control procedures, conventions and cross-government policies.

Feasibility requires that a proposal can be implemented accurately, sustainably and to the intended timetable without wasteful or nugatory spend.

Value for money requires that, in comparison to alternative proposals or doing nothing, the proposal delivers its stated policy objectives in a way that represents good value for the Exchequer as a whole, taking into account the chances of different degrees of success or failure.

Accounting officers carry personal responsibility for these standards and are directly accountable to Parliament through the Public Accounts Committee when they are not met.

Relevant to SDWH analysis of:

  • PAC preparation for accounting officers: the committee will test all four standards
  • Understanding the personal accountability framework that applies to Accounting Officers at arm's-length bodies and private sector contractors
  • Governance and oversight framework design for commercial programmes

How is value for money assessed in a business case?

HM Treasury's business case guidance applies a five-case model which requires value for money to be addressed explicitly at each stage of development.

The five cases are: the strategic case (the need for intervention and alignment with policy); the economic case (the identification and appraisal of options against value for money criteria); the commercial case (the procurement and contractual arrangements); the financial case (affordability and public sector cost); and the management case (deliverability and assurance arrangements).

Within the economic case, the guidance requires a minimum of four shortlisted options for further appraisal: business as usual (the benchmark); a "do minimum" option (a further benchmark for cost justification); a recommended option (the preferred way forward); and one or more alternative options of greater or lesser ambition. Value for money is assessed by comparing all options against business as usual and do minimum, not simply by evaluating the preferred option in isolation.

Relevant to SDWH analysis of:

  • Scrutiny of whether government business cases have been constructed to a standard that can withstand independent review
  • Identifying common weaknesses in options appraisal that the NAO and PAC are likely to focus on
  • Challenge of major capital investment decisions against the five-case framework

What is the four Es framework for value for money evaluation?

Government evaluation guidance extends the traditional three Es of economy, efficiency and effectiveness to a fourth — equity — reflecting the distributional dimension of public spending decisions.

Economy concerns minimising the cost of inputs: acquiring the right resources, in the right quantity and quality, at the right time, and at the best price.

Efficiency concerns the relationship between inputs and outputs: getting the maximum output from a given set of inputs, or delivering a given output at minimum cost.

Effectiveness concerns outcomes: the extent to which a policy or programme achieves its intended results, whether quantitative or qualitative.

Equity concerns distribution: whether the costs and benefits of a programme fall fairly across social groups, regions and generations.

Value for money evaluation uses these four dimensions as an organising framework, synthesising findings from process evaluations (which examine how a programme was delivered) and impact evaluations (which measure outcomes) into a comprehensive assessment of whether the public resources deployed were justified by the results achieved.

Relevant to SDWH analysis of:

  • Structuring independent reviews of programme performance against the four Es
  • Assessing whether government evaluations have addressed all four dimensions or focused narrowly on cost
  • Framing accountability challenge for programmes where equity effects are material

Value for money and performance audit

The International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) has developed a comprehensive framework of standards and guidance for performance audit — the independent examination of whether government is achieving economy, efficiency and effectiveness. These standards apply to INTOSAI's 200+ member SAIs, including the UK National Audit Office, and set the international benchmark for how value for money is assessed through independent audit.

The INTOSAI standards cited below are reproduced in summary form. Full texts are available at issai.org under INTOSAI's open access policy. Citations follow the standard INTOSAI format: ISSAI/GUID [number], [title], INTOSAI, [year].

What is performance audit?

Performance audit — also described as value for money audit — is defined by INTOSAI as an independent, objective and reliable examination of whether government undertakings, systems, operations, programmes, activities or organisations are operating in accordance with the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, and whether there is room for improvement.

Performance auditing aims to contribute to improved economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector. It also aims to contribute to good governance, accountability and transparency. Unlike financial audit, which examines whether accounts give a true and fair view, performance audit examines whether public resources have been used to achieve the intended results — and whether better results could have been achieved with the same or fewer resources.

Performance auditing seeks to provide new information, analysis or insights and, where appropriate, recommendations for improvement. It does not assess policy merit — the question of whether government's objectives were the right ones — but examines how effectively those objectives were pursued.

Relevant to SDWH analysis of:

  • The international standard against which value for money work can be assessed
  • Context and insights into the effectiveness of performance audit activity

What are the three Es — economy, efficiency and effectiveness — in value for money?

The three Es are the foundational principles of performance audit, defined in INTOSAI's Performance Audit Principles standard (ISSAI 300) as follows.

Economy means minimising the costs of resources. The resources used should be available in due time, in appropriate quantity and quality, and at the best price. Economy is concerned with inputs — what was spent and whether it was the minimum necessary to achieve the required quality.

Efficiency means getting the most from the available resources. It is concerned with the relationship between resources employed and outputs delivered in terms of quantity, quality and timing. Efficiency examines whether a given level of output could have been produced at lower cost, or whether more output could have been produced with the same resources.

Effectiveness concerns meeting the objectives set and achieving the intended results. Effectiveness examines outcomes — not just what was produced but whether it made the intended difference. A programme may be economical and efficient while still failing to be effective if the outputs do not produce the desired outcomes.

Together, the three Es provide a structured framework for diagnosing where value for money has been lost: at the input stage (economy), the process stage (efficiency), or the outcome stage (effectiveness).

Relevant to SDWH analysis of:

  • Structuring independent analytical reviews of government programmes using the 3Es framework
  • Identifying which dimension of value for money is most at risk in a given programme
  • Preparing accounting officers to respond to 3Es-based lines of inquiry from the PAC

What are the central concepts of performance audit?

INTOSAI's guidance on central concepts for performance auditing (GUID 3910) elaborates the conditions under which performance audit produces reliable, actionable findings. Three concepts are central: independence, ethics and evidence.

Independence is defined in two dimensions. Independence in fact allows the auditor to perform activities without being affected by influences that compromise professional judgement; to act with integrity and exercise objectivity and professional scepticism. Independence in appearance is the absence of circumstances that would cause a reasonable and informed stakeholder to doubt the auditor's integrity, objectivity or professional scepticism. Independence matters because of the judgements that must be made at every stage: identifying the topic; establishing the objective; identifying applicable criteria; determining the methodological approach; assessing evidence and forming conclusions; and writing a fair and balanced report. Threats to independence include self-interest, advocacy, familiarity, intimidation, self-review and management participation.

Ethics encompasses the moral principles that underpin the conduct of any independent examination of government activity: independence, integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and professional behaviour. INTOSAI emphasises that to be independent, and to be seen as such, the examiner must be free from situations which could impair professional judgement. These principles are not confined to statutory audit — they apply to any form of independent analytical scrutiny.

Evidence is the factual basis on which findings and conclusions rest. Performance audit evidence must be sufficient (enough of it to support the conclusion), appropriate (relevant and reliable), and obtained through systematic methods. The quality of evidence determines whether findings can withstand challenge. Conclusions that are not grounded in robust, verifiable evidence cannot credibly support recommendations for improvement or hold organisations to account.

Together, these three concepts — independence, ethics and evidence — define what distinguishes genuinely independent analytical scrutiny from advice, advocacy or internal review.

Relevant to SDWH analysis of:

  • Supporting SAIs to maintain and demonstrate independence in their performance audit work
  • Understanding the conditions under which independent scrutiny produces findings that are credible to Parliament and the public

What is the performance audit process from planning to follow-up?

INTOSAI's performance audit process guidance (GUID 3920) sets out the four phases through which a performance audit is designed, conducted and completed.

Planning covers topic selection, audit design and managing audit risk. Good planning defines the audit objective clearly, identifies the criteria against which performance will be assessed, and determines the evidence approach. The choice of criteria — the standard against which government performance is judged — is one of the most important methodological decisions in performance audit.

Conducting covers evidence gathering, the development of findings, and the determination of cause and effect. Findings should be based on sufficient, appropriate evidence and should distinguish between what went wrong, why it went wrong, and what the consequences were. Preliminary findings are discussed with the audited entity before the report is finalised.

Reporting covers the content of the report, the formulation of recommendations, communication with the audited entity, and distribution. Good performance audit reports are clear about the evidence base, present findings fairly, and make recommendations that are practical and actionable.

Follow-up examines whether the audited body has implemented the recommendations from a previous audit. Follow-up is essential to the accountability cycle: without it, audit findings become advisory rather than consequential.

Relevant to SDWH analysis of:

  • Supporting SAIs to design and deliver robust performance examinations that meet INTOSAI standards
  • Evaluating the quality of existing scrutiny work and identifying gaps in coverage or methodology

Independent analysis across corporate finance, procurement, infrastructure and governance

SDWH provides independent research, analysis and briefing on how government has approached these decisions — and what the evidence shows about what has and has not worked. If you would like to discuss how this applies to a specific programme or decision, get in touch.